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Abstract 
Some of the secret sharing schemes having unique quantum features like parallelism and entanglement are 
supposed to be relatively secure. Different schemes proposed by various researchers over the years have 
features which could be specific to the nature and need of a situation. Following Hsu’s proposed scheme 
we propose a secret sharing scheme using Grover’s search algorithm for a four qubit system with several 
marked states. Further, the scheme has been generalized to an n-qubit system.   
 
Introduction 
Quantum secret sharing can be accredited as one of the major implications of quantum 
information processing. It addresses the problem of secured transfer of information 
through quantum channels to distant receivers. With the advent of quantum computers, 
quantum secret sharing schemes are being extensively studied by several researchers. 
These quantum counterparts of the classical secret sharing schemes exploit unique 
quantum features like parallelism and entanglement. The message to be communicated is 
encrypted in arbitrary quantum states and is sent to intended receivers after initial 
quantum manipulations by the sender. These manipulations are so performed that none of 
the receivers can retrieve the complete secret message single-handedly. The idea of 
quantum secret sharing scheme was originally conceived and implemented by Hillery et 
al [1] using three and four particle Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [2]. 
Similar to the protocol given in [1], Karlson et al [3] showed the implementation of a 
quantum secret sharing protocol using two-particle quantum entanglement. Later, (k,n)-
threshold quantum secret sharing scheme was proposed by Cleve et al [4]   in which the 
encoded quantum state is split among n people such that any k of them can reconstruct 
the encoded information, while number of people, if less than k, can never succeed. This 
has been experimentally demonstrated in [5,6]. Gottesman [7] demonstrated mixed state 
quantum secret sharing by discarding a share from pure state scheme, the only constraints 
being monotonicity [8] and the no cloning theorem [9-11]. This quantum secret sharing 
scheme for general access structures was shown by Smith [12] in a somewhat different 
manner. Karimpour et al [13] demonstrated quantum secret sharing schemes based on 
entanglement swapping of generalized d-level Bell states. Cabello [14] generalized 
quantum secret sharing schemes to n-particles. Recently, Guo-Ping Guo et al [15] 
presented quantum secret sharing without entanglement. 
 
In 2003, a new dimension was added to quantum secret sharing schemes with the 
incorporation of Grover’s unsorted database search algorithm [16]. Li-Yi-Hsu proposed a 
two-qubit quantum secret sharing protocol based on Grover’s algorithm [17]. Apart from 
the operational aspects the protocol is different from the above mentioned schemes in the 
sense of cheat detection. With this protocol cheating could be detected immediately 
without exhausting a portion of the sequence of measurements of outcomes. In a two-
qubit Grover’s algorithm, the marked state can be retrieved with full probability after a 
single iteration. Hsu’s protocol is based on this property. In this paper we present a 
generalization of two-qubit quantum secret sharing protocol based on Grover’s algorithm 
to n-qubit system. We will show that marked state can be found with certainty after a 
single iteration for any number of qubits in Grover’s search algorithm if the number of 
marked states is one-fourth of the total number of elements in search space. Thus two-
qubit quantum secret sharing protocol based on Grover’s search algorithm can be 
generalized to n-qubit secret sharing scheme. The increase in the number of marked states 
with the increase in number of qubits not only reduces the probability of error but also 
enhances the security aspect of the secret sharing protocol. The message can be split and 
encoded into various marked states. We start with a review of original scheme presented 
by Hsu. 
 
 
Two qubits secret sharing protocol 
Alice, the sender, randomly prepares a two-qubit superposition state 1S of the form 
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 0 1 1 2 0 1+ ⊗ +  
 
The superposition state can be the product of any two of the following four states: ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 0 1 , 1 2 0 1 , 1 2 0 1 , 1 2 0 1i i+ − + − . The message is 
encoded in the marked states 01 or 10  , whereas the states 00 or 11 are used to 
detect any possible eavesdropping. 
 
She performs WP  operation on 1S  where WP  is of the form  
 
WP = 1 2 W W− , 
(1) 
W  being the marked state contains the secret information. If the message is encrypted 
in the state 10 , then  
 
WP 1S  = 1 WS = ( )( )1 2 10 10 1 2 00 01 10 11⎡ ⎤⎡ − ⎤ + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
( )( )1 2 00 01 10 11⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦  
(2) 
 
This transformation changes the phase of the desired state keeping the other states 
unchanged. Alice then sends these two qubits to Bob and Charlie who are at a distant 
place. The qubits sent by Alice are such that Bob receives the first qubit and Charlie the 
second one. It is assumed that at most one of them may be a cheat who may try to capture 
both qubits so that he can retrieve whole of the information by himself. Hence Alice also 
aims to detect any possible cheating strategy.  
 
Once she has confirmed via classical channel that each one of them is in receipt of their 
respective qubit, she makes a public announcement of her initial state 1S  . Even after 
Alice’s declaration of the initial state 1S Bob and Charlie can have access to the 
encrypted information only when they combine their respective qubits and perform 
1S
P− on the two qubits collectively. 
 
1S
P− 1 WS = 1 12 S S I⎡ − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ( )( )1 2 00 01 10 11⎡ ⎤+ − +⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ){ } ( )( ){ } ( )( )2 1 2 00 01 10 11 1 2 00 01 10 11 1 2 00 01 10 11I⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + + + + + + − + − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
10=  
(3) 
 
Τhus the secret information could only be gained collectively. 
 
Alice can check any possible eavesdropping by encrypting her secret information only in 
the states 01  or 10  while she uses states 00  and 11  for cheat detection. Hence, 
according to the protocol, Bob and Charlie are supposed to inform Alice if their outcomes 
of collective measurements are correlated. If the result of measurement comes out to be 
correlated then honest receiver concludes that eavesdropping has occurred or Alice has 
encrypted nothing. In either case, the receivers inform Alice about correlated outcomes. 
The process is aborted if Alice detects any eavesdropping otherwise she continue sending 
message to the intended receivers. 
  
n-qubit Grover's algorithm after one iteration. 
The Grover's algorithm addresses the following problem: for a search space of N items 
with M marked states within it such that1 M N≤ ≤ , Grover’s algorithm can find the 
marked state in ( )O N M  iterations. We have shown below the state of the n-qubit 
system after iterating the algorithm once. For simplicity and without loss of generality we 
can assume that 2nN = elements. 
 
For a search space S, of 2nN = elements, we can represent the N elements using an n-
qubit register with their indices 0, 1i N= − − − − − − . If a set of M elements within the 
search space represents the marked states, that is, they are solution to the search problem, 
then the marked states can be identified by a function  f  which maps the elements of S to 
either 0 or 1, { }: 0,1f S → , such that 1f =  for the marked elements only. The steps of 
the Grover’s algorithm are as follows: 
 
1. Register preparation →  A register ni ⊗  of n qubits and an ancilla qubit 0  to evaluate 
the oracle is prepared.  
1 0 0
nX ⊗= ⊗  
(4) 
 
2. Initialization →  Apply H, Hadamard gate, to each of the n qubits in the register, and 
the HX gate to the ancilla qubit, where X is a NOT gate.  
 ( )1
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0 0
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(5) 
 
3. Applying the oracle →  The oracle is applied in the form of operator WP  which flips the 
state of ancilla qubit on identifying the marked state.  
 
( )WP i q i q f i= ⊕  
If  i  is a marked state, then ( ) 1f i = . Since the state of ancilla qubit is 0 1
2
⎛ − ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, the 
action of  WP  can also be written as 
 
( ) ( )0 1 0 11
2 2
f i
WP i i
⎛ − ⎞ ⎛ − ⎞= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
(6) 
 
As the state of ancilla remains unchanged, the above expression can be rewritten as 
 
( ) ( )1 f iWP i i= −  
 
Thus the effect of the operator WP  on the superposed n-qubit register can safely be 
expressed as  
 
1 1 1
2
0 0 0
1 1 1N N N
W
i i iN M
X P i i i
N N N
− − −
= = =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  
(7) 
For M marked states, 
1
0
N
i M
i
−
=
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ indicates the summation over all i which are the marked 
states, and 
1
0
N
i N
i
−
=
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  indicates the summation over all i which are the remaining elements 
of the search space. 
 
3. Applying inversion about average operator → The application of operator 
S
P , which 
performs inversion about average results into 
 
1 1 1 1
3 2
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 12
N N N N
S
i i i iN M
X P X i i I i i
N N N N
− − − −
= = = =
⎧ ⎫⎧ ⎫ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = − −⎨ ⎬⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
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− −
= =
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫= +⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
(8) 
 
This represents the state of the system after iterating the algorithm once. It can be easily 
verified that if a measurement is made the coefficient of the unmarked states becomes 
zero for 4M N= , that is, the number of marked states is one-fourth of the total search 
space. Thus one of the marked states can be found with certainty if a measurement is 
made after a single iteration.  
 
The probability SP , of finding one out of M marked states after first iteration can be 
calculated from eq.(8), 
2
3 4
S
N MP M
N N
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
                          
2 3
9 24 16M M M
N N N
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , 
Similarly, the probability SP ′ , of finding an undesired item is 
( )
2
4
S
N MP N M
N N
−⎛ ⎞′ = − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Obviously, 1S SP P ′+ = . 
(9) 
 
Fig.1. shows the plot of success probability after single iteration for 0 1M N< ≤ . 
Success probability becomes one, that is one of the marked states can be found with 
certainty only when 1 4M N = .  
  
Four-qubit secret sharing scheme 
The initial superposition state of four qubits can be a product of any of the following 
single qubit states: ( )( )1 2 0 1+ , ( )( )1 2 0 1− , ( )( )1 2 0 1i+ , and 
( )( )1 2 0 1i− denoted as , , ,i i+ − + − . Suppose Alice, the sender, prepares the 
superposition state 1S  of the form,  
 
( ) 41 1 0 12S
⊗⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
1 ( 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001
4
= + + + + + + + + +  
1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111 )+ + + + + +  
(10) 
 
She then encodes the message in the marked states. As discussed earlier, the number of 
marked states in this case will be four. She encodes half of the message in any two of the 
four marked states and the remaining message in the other two marked states. Same 
message can be encoded in different bit strings, each of which represents the element of 
the search space. This is because the oracle recognizes and flips the sign of the marked 
state by considering a function f which maps the marked state, with specific queries, to 1. 
The function f is so designed that it identifies two elements of the search space for same 
query. This can be interpreted as tagging the same message to two different bit strings. 
 
After encrypting the secret message, Alice applies the operator WP  on the initial state 1S , 
which inverts the phase of the marked states. Suppose the marked states 
are 0100 , 0110 , 1000  and 1011  then the state of the system evolves to an entangled 
state  
1
1 ( 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111
4W
P S = + + + − + − +  
1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111 )− + + − + + + +  
(11) 
 
Alice then sends all four qubits to the distant receivers to whom the message is to be 
communicated. The receivers are informed in advance about the order of the bit strings in 
the sense that who shall receive the first qubit and so on. Here it can be said that even if 
three out of four receivers are dishonest, they cannot decipher the secret information 
without the joint effort of all four receivers. 
 
At this stage, Alice confirms classically that each of the receivers have received their 
respective qubits. It is assumed that the dishonest receiver(s) or for that matter any 
eavesdropper may try to get access to the secret information without any assistance from 
Charlie. Hence the receivers are supposed to inform her about receiving their respective 
qubits. Since she does not know who the cheat is therefore she announces her initial 
preparation 1S  only after getting confirmation from all four. Now the honest receiver(s) 
combine his qubit with other qubits and perform 
1S
P−  to retrieve the secret message. The 
dishonest member(s) cannot do any mischief while performing the collective operation as 
the honest member(s) can check him. 
 
After performing the inversion about average operation,
1S
P− , the receivers will obtain 
any one of the four marked states. 
1S
P− 1WP S = 1 0100 0110 1000 10112 ⎡ + + + ⎤⎣ ⎦  
  
As the quantum searching process is probabilistic, Alice needs to send two or more sets 
of 1WP S  in order to communicate the complete message. The probability of error at the 
receiving end is reduced because each half of the message occurs twice with same 
probability.  
 
One of the possible ways of cheat detection is that Alice does not encrypt any secret 
information and sends the state 1WP S  just to check the authenticity of the intended 
receivers. She then asks the receivers to inform her classically about their measurement 
outcome. If the outcome differs from the four marked states, she immediately detects 
cheating with a probability of  11 16  and stops the process. The dishonest receiver(s) 
cannot cheat by giving false information about his outcome because he does not know 
what the marked state is. The dishonest receiver(s) or any eavesdropper may try to 
capture all the four qubits therefore the sender and the honest receiver(s) must check any 
possible eavesdropping. 
 
Suppose an eavesdropper or the dishonest receiver(s) succeeds in getting hold of all the 
four qubits. His aim will be to retrieve the secret information all by himself. The number 
of possible four-qubit product states with , , ,i i+ − + −  would be 256. The possibility 
of dishonest member getting access to the secret message with certainty is only if he 
performs the correct 
1S
P−  operation. The probability of which is 1 256 . If he applies the 
wrong 
1S
P−  operator, the probability of getting the correct state will be very low while 
Alice’s probability of cheat detection will increase because the number of unmarked 
states is quite large than the marked states. 
 
Secondly, the cheater may capture the state sent by Alice and send some other state to the 
legitimate receivers. Thus after Alice’s announcement of the initial state, he can 
transform the captured state accordingly. The probability of cheat detection is very high 
since he does not know the state 1WP S . For a general four qubit product state iS  with 
four marked states there are 1820 possible W iP S . The probability of sending the correct 
W iP S  and going undetected is1 1820 . He may send the state W iP S  in which out of the 
four chosen marked states only one or two or three marked states tally with Alice’s 
marked states. Thus the total probability of not getting detected is1 728 . 
 
Table1. shows the outcomes of some of the 
is
P− 1WP S , where i = 1.....10  represent the 
possible initial states. Only on applying the correct 
is
P− operator, the measurement 
outcome will be one of the marked states with certainty. In any other case the probability 
of getting one of the marked states is remarkably reduced. 
 
This four-qubit secret sharing scheme based on Grover’s algorithm can be generalized to 
n-qubit secret sharing scheme. For an n-qubit secret sharing scheme, there are n 
legitimate users. Alice, the quantum information sender, prepares the initial n-qubit 
product state. The initial state of this quantum secret sharing scheme should be a product 
state because the initial state of Grover’s search algorithm is necessarily a product state 
for maximum success probability. 
 
Alice prepares a n-qubit initial product state having N substates. She encodes the secret 
information in M of the N substates. These M states constitute the marked states. As 
discussed earlier M should be one-fourth of N. The message is split into two halves. The 
encryption of the secret message is such that 2M  substates are tagged with half of the 
message and the other 2M  substates with remaining part of the message. Alice then 
applies the operator WP on the initial state. W denotes the M marked states. She then 
sends all the n qubits to respective receivers. After confirming that all receivers are in 
receipt of their respective qubits, she announces her initial iS  in public. The receivers 
can perform the operation 
1S
P−  when they combine their qubits. The application of 
1S
P−  
gives one of the marked states with certainty. Since quantum measurements are 
probabilistic therefore Alice needs to send few more sets of  W iP S  for complete transfer 
of information. The advantage of labeling  2M  states with same portion of the message 
is to increase the probability of obtaining the message with higher accuracy, that is, the 
error is minimized. Also the splitting of message into two halves decreases the success 
probability of eavesdropper. The detection probability increases with the number of 
qubits because the eavesdropper cannot determine the initial state or the exact 
combination of marked states with certainty. 
 
Single marked state 
Another quantum secret sharing protocol based on Grover’s algorithm with single 
marked state is considered. Hsu’s protocol for a two qubit system with single marked 
state could be extended to three, four, and five-qubit entangled states. As the number of 
qubits increases to three or four, the probability of obtaining the desired state is 
somewhat decreased hence the sender may be required to send four to five identical sets 
of qubits to the distant receivers. However, for a five qubit system, the probability of 
getting the desired state with certainty becomes similar to that of a two qubit system. The 
number of iterations in this case would be more. For example, for a five qubit system 
total number of iterations will be four and the sender will have to transfer the qubits after 
performing three complete iterations and operation WP  of the fourth iteration. The 
number of receivers will be of the order of number of qubits so that cheating becomes 
relatively difficult. Also, the probability of applying the correct operator by any cheat 
decreases with the increase in initial superposition states. 
 
We now exemplify our analysis for a three qubit system. Alice wants to send some secret 
information to a distant place where she has three agents who are supposed to receive it. 
She follows the following steps. 
 
1. She initializes the system to a superposition of 32 8=  states by performing some local 
operations. The amplitude of each of the eight states is  ( )1 2 2 . She randomly prepares 
some state ψ   (say) 
 
    ψ   =  ( )1 2 2  ( )000 001 010 011 100 101 110 001+ + + + + + +  
 
2. After preparing state ψ  she performs unitary operation WP  on it. Let W  be 110  for 
the present case. 
 
     WP ψ  ( )( )1 2 2 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111Wψ= = + + + + + − +  
 This changes the phase of the desired state. Now she performs Pψ− on Wψ and gets 
 
 ( )1 4 2  ( )000 001 010 011 100 101+ + + + + ( )( ) ( )( )5 4 2 110 1 4 2 111+ +  
This increases the amplitude of the desired states thereby decreasing the amplitude of rest 
of the states. This is her first iteration. 
 
3. For the second iteration she performs only WP  and then sends her three qubits to her 
three distant agents Bob, Charlie and Trent who are supposed to decrypt the secret 
message only if they work collectively. 
 
At this stage she confirms classically that each of them received their respective qubits. 
She announces her initial preparation only after getting confirmation from all three. Now 
the three receivers combine their qubits and perform Pψ−  to retrieve the secret message. 
This leads to the completion of second iteration. The dishonest members cannot do any 
mischief while performing the collective operation as the honest member can check them.  
 
4. Thus the amplitude of the desired state rises to (11/8√2) thereby decreasing the 
amplitude of other states to (1/8√2). Alice thus needs to send at least two sets of her 
initial preparations for the confirmed transfer of the secret information. Fig. 2 shows the 
maximal increase in probability amplitude of the desired state after the required number 
of iteration performed on the initial uniform superposition state. 
 
After performing the operation Pψ− , all the three receivers perform their own local 
measurements in the computational basis. One of the receivers or at the most two of them 
may be cheat and may try to get hold of all the three qubits so the honest receiver and the 
sender must be cautious. However, in the present scheme even if the dishonest receivers 
succeed in capturing the other two qubits there is a faint possibility of their retrieving the 
secret information on their own unless they know the correct Pψ− to be performed. 
Performing a wrong Uψ−  will not lead to a substantial increase in amplitude of the 
desired state. 
 
 Furthermore, precise no. of iterations is important. As in the present case, the minimum 
number of iterations required for increasing the probability of desired state is two. After 
single iteration the amplitude of the desired state increases to 5/4√2. If Alice chooses to 
have only one iteration and she sends the three qubits to the three distant receivers just 
after performing phase rotation operation once, then the chances of getting the desired 
state by the three receivers is about 78%. Thus to ensure correct retrieval with some 
degree of confidence Alice needs to send four to five identical sets of qubits. If she goes 
for a third iteration as well, the probability of the desired state reduces to 33% and 
thereby increases the probability of rest of the states to 95%. So for again retrieving the 
desired state we will have to repeat same quantum mechanical steps for a definite number 
of times. Although there would be some instances where the chances of retrieving the 
desired state with certainty are maximal but by and large it is observed that with increase 
in number of qubits the result of measurement is not deterministic so the number of sets 
of qubits to be initially sent by the sender increases accordingly. Table 2. shows the 
success probability to reach the desired state after each iteration for two, three, four and 
five qubits. 
 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
Grover’s search algorithm for an unsorted database containing N items retrieves the 
desired item after performing a sequence of unitary operations on a pure state. Just by 
having the input in superposition state it has a supremacy over its classical analogue. Its 
classical counterpart with same amount of hardware would examine each state in the 
database individually. We can find an object in ( )O N steps instead of ( )O N classical 
steps. Also if the number of desired states is one-fourth of the total number of elements in 
the database then the desired state is obtained after single Grover iteration only. This 
efficaciousness of Grover’s algorithm is exploited for the quantum secret sharing 
protocol. Moreover cheating becomes very much less pronounced in this case. To acquire 
the whole information alone the eavesdropper or one of the deceptive agents needs all the 
sets of qubits which in itself is a difficult task. In case he somehow succeeds in acquiring 
all the sets of qubits, applying the right quantum mechanical inversion about average 
operator has a very small probability due to the increase in the number of possible states 
with the number of qubits. And if he applies the wrong inversion about average unitary 
operation the probability of getting the desired state is considerably reduced, 
consequently leading to wrong results. Therefore the increased cost due to increase in 
number of iterations can be compensated by high degree of security.  
 
 
 
 
 
i                    iS  isP− 1WP S  
1. + + + +  ( )1 0001 0011 0101 0111
2
+ + +  
2. + − + −  − 1WP S  
3. − − + +  − 1WP S  
4. − − − −  − 1WP S  
5. i i i i+ + + +  − 1WP S  
6. i i i i− − − −  − 1WP S  
7. i i+ + + +  ( )1 0000 0100 1000 1100
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞− + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
( )3 0001 0101
8 8
i⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
( )1 0010 0110 1001 1010 1101 1110
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ + + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( )1 0011 0111
8 8
i⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ( )
3 1011 1111
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
8. i i i i− + − +  ( )1 0000 0110 1001 1100 1111
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ + + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
( )1 0001 0111
8 8
i⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
( )1 0010 1000 1011 1110
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ − + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3 0011
8 8
i⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
( )3 0100 1101
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
1 0101
8 8
i⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
3 1010
8 8
i−⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
9. i i− − − −  − 1WP S  
1
0. 
i i+ − + −  − 1WP S  
Table 1. The outcomes of some of the 
is
P− 1WP S , where i = 1.....10  represent the 
possible initial states. 
 
 
 
2 qubits 3 qubits 4 qubits 5 qubits 
1st iteration 100% 78% 47% 25% 
2nd iteration  94.5% 90% 60% 
3rd iteration   96.1% 89% 
4th iteration    99.9% 
Table 2. Success probability after each iteration for two, three, four and five qubits. 
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Figure 1: Probability of success of Grover’s search algorithm after first iteration. 
 
 
Fig.2 Probability amplitude of the desired state that increases after the required number of 
iterations performed on the initial uniform superposition state of three qubits. 
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